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Abstract
The long-term evolution (LTE) is the newly adopted technology to offer enhanced capacity and coverage for current
mobility networks, which experience a constant traffic increase and skyrocketing bandwidth demands. This new
cellular communication system, built upon a redesigned physical layer and based on an orthogonal frequency
division multiple access (OFDMA) modulation, features robust performance in challenging multipath environments
and substantially improves the performance of the wireless channel in terms of bits per second per Hertz (bps/Hz).
Nevertheless, as all wireless systems, LTE is vulnerable to radio jamming attacks. Such threats have security
implications especially in the case of next-generation emergency response communication systems based on LTE
technologies. This proof of concept paper overviews a series of new effective attacks (smart jamming) that extend the
range and effectiveness of basic radio jamming. Based on these new threats, a series of new potential security
research directions are introduced, aiming to enhance the resiliency of LTE networks against such attacks. A
spread-spectrum modulation of the main downlink broadcast channels is combined with a scrambling of the radio
resource allocation of the uplink control channels and an advanced system information message encryption scheme.
Despite the challenging implementation on commercial networks, which would require inclusion of these solutions
in future releases of the LTE standard, the security solutions could strongly enhance the security of LTE-based national
emergency response communication systems.
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1 Introduction
As mobile phones steadily become more powerful and
bandwidth demands skyrocket, cellular operators are
rapidly deploying broadband data services and infrastruc-
ture to enhance capacity. The long-term evolution (LTE)
is the recently deployed standard technology for com-
munication networks, offering higher data speeds and
improved bandwidth. This new cellular communication
system is the natural evolution of 3rd Generation Part-
nership Project (3GPP)-based access networks, enhanc-
ing the Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
(UMTS).
LTE provides capacity to user equipments (UEs) by
means of a centralized assignment of radio resources.
A newly enhanced physical (PHY) layer is implemented
based on orthogonal frequency division multiple access
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(OFDMA) and substantially improves the performance of
the former wideband code division multiple access (W-
CDMA) [1]. The newmodulation scheme provides a large
capacity and throughput, potentially reaching a raw bit
rate of 300 Mbps in the downlink with advanced multiple
input multiple output (MIMO) configurations [1].
Due to its spectrum efficiency and great capacity, LTE is
planned to be adopted as the basis for the next-generation
emergency response communication system, the Nation-
wide Interoperable Public Safety Broadband Network [2].
In this context, the characteristics of such LTE-based pub-
lic safety networks are already under consideration in the
industry [3]. Note that, specially in the case of this appli-
cation, the security requirements of LTE communication
networks are of paramount importance.
Despite the tremendous capacity and system enhance-
ments implemented by LTE, cellular networks are known
to be, as any kind of wireless network, vulnerable to
radio jamming. Although it is a simple and well-known
attack, radio jamming is the most common way to launch
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a localized denial of service (DoS) attack against a cel-
lular network [4]. The impact of such attacks is very
local and mainly constrained by the transmitted power
of the jamming device. The attacker is only able to deny
the service locally to UEs located in its vicinity. How-
ever, more sophisticated attacks have been discovered as a
potentially more effective way to jam LTE networks [5,6].
These smart jamming attacks aim to saturate specifically
the main downlink broadcast channel of LTE networks
in order to launch a local DoS attack that requires less
power, making it stealthier. Further complex attacks, such
as low-power smart jamming, identify the actual phys-
ical resource blocks (PRBs) assigned to essential uplink
control channels by capturing the unprotected broadcast
messages sent from the base station (eNodeB). The inter-
ception of such unencrypted network configuration data
allows the attacker to selectively saturate uplink control
channels in order to extend the range of the attack to an
entire cell or sector. Note that network configuration con-
tained in the broadcast channel can also be leveraged to
deploy an effective rogue base station and other kinds of
attacks.
Although radio jamming attacks have a rather local
range, they become highly relevant in the current cyber-
security scenario. Reports of very targeted and extremely
sophisticated attacks have emerged over the last 2 years
[7]. These attacks, popularly known as advanced per-
sistent threats (APTs), span over months or even years
and target large corporations and government institu-
tions with the goal of stealing intellectual property or
other valuable digital assets [8]. The advent of APTs has
substantially changed the set of assumptions in the cur-
rent threat scenario. When it comes to very well-planned
and funded cyber attacks, the scale of the threat is not
important anymore. Instead, achieving a very specific and
localized goal for economic benefit or military advantage
is the key element. In this context, scenarios such as a
local DoS attack against the cell service around, for exam-
ple, a large corporation’s headquarters or the New York
Stock Exchange becomes very relevant. DoS is also often
a tool used to knock a phone off a secure network and
force it down to an insecure radio access network (RAN)
to pursue further attacks and data exfiltrations [9].
The goal of this proof of concept paper is to raise aware-
ness on the traditionally overlooked threat of radio jam-
ming and to propose a combination of potential research
directions and LTE RAN enhancements against sophisti-
cated jamming attacks. This theoretical enhanced security
architecture relies on a boost of the jamming resiliency of
the main downlink broadcast channels and the encryption
of the data broadcasted in it. The potential results would
be twofold. On one hand, an attacker would not be able
to easily jam the downlink broadcast channels and, there-
fore, deny the service to UEs in its vicinity. On the other
hand, no network configuration information could be
intercepted and decoded, preventing an attacker to gain
knowledge on each cell’s specific configuration, which
could be leveraged in security attacks. Finally, a proac-
tive smart jamming multi-antenna cancelation technique
is presented.
Some of the proposed security solutions involve sub-
stantial changes at the PHY layer of LTE networks which
could be very challenging to implement on a commer-
cial network and would require collaboration within the
industry. Nevertheless, such security architecture could
substantially increase the reliability and resiliency against
security attacks of the Nationwide Interoperable Public
Safety Broadband Network [2]. Anti-jamming enhance-
ments could be included to the list of requirements for
LTE-based public safety networks that are not in the scope
of current releases of the LTE standard, such as direct
communication and group communication [3].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 briefly overviews the cell selection procedure
in LTE networks, the main downlink broadcast channels,
and the feasibility of eavesdropping unprotected broad-
casted network configuration messages. Three attacks
against LTE networks are described in Section 3. The pro-
posed research directions and theoretical architecture to
mitigate radio jamming attacks is introduced in Section 4.
Finally, related work is reviewed in Section 5, and the
concluding remarks are presented in Section 6.
2 Initial access to LTE networks
This section overviews the basic procedures necessary for
a phone to synchronize with and connect to an LTE net-
work. Any UE willing to access the network must first
perform a cell selection procedure. After this procedure,
the UE decodes the physical broadcast channel (PBCH) to
extract the basic system information that allows the other
channels in the cell to be configured and operated. The
messages carried on this channels are unencrypted and
can be eavesdropped by a passive radio sniffer. Once at
this point, the UE can initiate an actual connection with
the network by means of a random access procedure and
establish a radio access bearer (RAB) in order to send
and receive user traffic. The whole process is portrayed in
Figure 1.
2.1 Cell search procedure
The cell search procedure consists of a series of synchro-
nization steps that allow the UE to determine time and
frequency parameters required to detect and demodulate
downlink signals as well as to transmit uplink signals with
the right timing. The three major steps in this procedure
are symbol timing acquisition, carrier frequency synchro-
nization, and sampling clock synchronization. To achieve
full synchronization, the UE detects and decodes the
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Figure 1 LTE initial access.
primary synchronization signal (PSS) and the secondary
synchronization signal (SSS), which are fully described
in [10]. The mapping of the PSS and SSS in the cen-
tral subcarriers of the LTE frame as well as the main
functions of these synchronization signals is shown in
Figure 2.
The PSS enables the UE to acquire the time slot bound-
ary independently from the cyclic prefix configuration of
the cell, which at this point is unknown to the UE. Based
on the downlink frame structure, the PSS is transmitted
twice per radio frame. This enables the UE to get time syn-
chronized on a 5-ms basis, which simplifies the required
inter-frequency and inter-RAT measurements. The PSS is
transmitted occupying the six central PRBs of the LTE fre-
quency configuration [11]. With 12 subcarriers per PRB,
this results in 1.08 MHz of bandwidth (BW). This way,
independently of the BW configuration of the cell, the UE
is able to decode it.
The next step is to obtain the radio frame timing and
the group identity of the cell, which is found in the SSS. In
the time domain, the SSS is transmitted in the preceding
symbol to the PSS. The SSS also has a 5-ms periodic-
ity and occupies 62 of the 72 central subcarriers so it
can be decoded without knowledge of the system BW
configuration.
Decoding this signal, the device determines the unique
identity of the cell. At this point, the terminal can get
fully synchronized with the eNodeB because the reference
signals are transmitted in well-defined resource elements
and the current synchronization allows locating them. A
reference symbol from the generated reference signal pat-
tern is transmitted on every sixth subcarrier. In the time
domain, every fourth OFDM symbol holds a reference
symbol. This results on four reference symbols per PRB.
2.2 LTE physical broadcast channel
The LTE PBCH is crucial for the successful operation of
the LTE radio interface. Therefore, its transmission has to
be optimized so it can be reliably decoded by cell edge
users with low latency and low impact on battery life.
Figure 2 Primary and secondary synchronization signals mapping andmain functions.
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This is achieved by means of low system overhead (the
effective data rate is of just 350 bps) and transmission
with the lowest modulation and coding scheme (MCS)
in order to minimize the bit error rate (BER) for a given
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) [1].
The main LTE system information is transmitted over
the PBCH within the master information block (MIB).
This message contains the most frequently transmitted
parameters, essential for an initial access to the cell, such
as the system BW, the physical hybrid ARQ indicator
channel (PHICH) structure and the most significant eight
bits of the system frame number (SFN).
The remainder of the system configuration is encoded
in the system information blocks (SIBs), which are modu-
lated on the physical downlink shared channel (PDSCH).
These messages can be mapped on the PDSCH based on
their broadcast id, the system information RAN tempo-
rary identifier (SI-RNTI), which is fixed in the specifica-
tions and therefore known a priori to all UEs and potential
attackers. The SIB-1 message contains transport parame-
ters necessary to connect to the cell as well as scheduling
information, and the SIB-2 message contains informa-
tion on all common and shared channels. Subsequent SIB
messages define multiple parameters, such as the power
thresholds for cell re-selection and the list of neighboring
cells.
2.3 MIB and SIB message eavesdropping
The MIB and SIB messages are broadcasted on PRBs
known a priori and transmitted with no encryption.
Therefore, a passive sniffer is able to decode them. This
simplifies the initial access procedure for the UEs but
could be potentially leveraged by an attacker to craft
sophisticated jamming attacks, optimize the configuration
of a rogue base station or tune other types of sophisticated
attacks. Figure 3a,b presents our lab system configuration
eavesdropped with a commercial of-the-shelf LTE wire-
less traffic sniffer. Note that details such as the system
BW, the cell identity, and the MCC and the mobile net-
work code (MNC) of the eNodeB are broadcasted in the
clear. These values have been faded out on purpose in the
figures.
Similarly, using the same commercial traffic sniffer, the
subsequent SIB messages can be intercepted. For exam-
ple, the SIB-2 messages contains the PRB mapping of
other control channels, such as the uplink (UL) resources
reserved for the UE random access procedure on the
random access channel (RACH).
Note that a commercial traffic sniffer is not neces-
sary to obtain this information. A skilled programmer
could design a PBCH traffic sniffer implemented on a
cheap software-defined radio (SDR) platform such as the
universal software radio peripheral (USRP) [12], which
is commonly used as radio transceiver in GSM (Global
Figure 3MIB (a) and SIB-1 (b) LTE messages eavesdropped with
a commercial traffic sniffer.
System of Mobile Communications) open source projects
[13].
3 Attacks against cellular networks
Radio jamming is the deliberate transmission of radio sig-
nals to disrupt communications by decreasing the SNR
of the received signal. This attack essentially consists
of blasting a high-power constant signal over the entire
target band of the system under attack [4,14].
This attack is broadly known as a simple and common
way to attack a wireless network and has been widely stud-
ied in the literature in the context of wireless local area
networks (WLAN) [4], sensor networks [15], and cellular
networks [14]. Despite the attack’s simplicity, often, the
only solution is to locate and neutralize the attacker, spe-
cially in the situation where the entire band of the system
is being jammed. The very large amount of transmitted
power, though, results in a reduced stealthiness so more
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elaborated schemes to jam cellular networks are being
proposed in the literature.
It has been shown that a standard barrage jamming
attack is the optimal jamming strategy when the attacker
has no knowledge of the target signal [16]. This section
overviews specific derivations of radio jamming attacks
against cellular networks based on the knowledge of the
target LTE signal that an attacker can obtain from publicly
available documents and standards. A popular new threat
vector that can be exploited as a result of such attacks is
also described.
3.1 Downlink smart jamming
Downlink smart jamming consists of generating mali-
cious radio signals in order to interfere with the recep-
tion of essential downlink control channels. A recent
report introduces the potential theoretical results of jam-
ming the PBCH of LTE networks [5]. The authors of
the original study expanded the details of this study in
a recent paper [6]. This attack, which could be applied
to both 2G and 3G networks as well, targets this chan-
nel because, as described in Section 2.1, its assigned
PRBs are known a priori and always mapped to the
central 72 subcarriers of the OFDMA signal. Given
that this channel is required to configure and oper-
ate the other channels in the cell, this jamming attack
is characterized by a low duty cycle and a fairly low
bandwidth.
The range of the jammer in this case is still rather
small, with a very localized impact. The transmission and
modulation characteristics of the PBCH still require a
fairly high-power interfering signal to deny the service
to noncell edge users. Note that, in order to outpower
the legitimate signal, the attacker is bounded by the large
transmitted power at the eNodeB and the potentially low
transmitted power of the jamming device.
More sophisticated versions of this attack have been
proposed, targeting the downlink pilot signals used by the
UE to estimate the channel for signal equalization [17].
However, Release 10 of the LTE standard covers the con-
cepts of heterogeneous networks (HetNets), with strong
enhancements in the pilot signals to avoid strong inter-
ference between the pilots sent by different overlaying
cells (macrocells and pico/femto/metrocells) [18]. As a
consequence of the inter-cell interference coordination
(ICIC) efforts of Release 10, the downlink (DL) pilot sig-
nals might experience an enhancement in their resiliency
against jamming.
3.2 Uplink (low-power) smart jamming
Low-power smart jamming takes a step further by tar-
geting essential uplink control channels. Note that, as
depicted in Figure 4, the range of an uplink smart jam-
ming attack is less local and covers the entire cell or sector.
This is because the attacker jams UL control channels,
preventing the eNodeB from receiving essential UL sig-
naling messages required for the correct operation of the
cell. By overwhelming reception at the eNodeB by means
of a jamming signal, the attacker is effectively preventing
the base station to communicate with every UE in the cell,
thus extending the range of the attack to the entire cell.
Moreover, the attacker is not bounded by the high
power of downlink signals transmitted by the eNodeB
(often in the range of 48 dBm), but by the maximum
power, a legitimate UE can transmit, which is fixed at
23 dBm in the case of LTE [19]. In this case, an attacker sit-
ting in the vicinity of the eNodeB transmitting at the same
power level as any legitimate smartphone could poten-
tially jam the uplink control messages of all the UEs within
a given cell or sector. Furthermore, the attacker could use
a very directive antenna pointed towards the eNodeB and
substantially enhance the effectiveness of the attack.
Figure 4 Impact range of radio jamming vs UL smart jamming.
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This type of attack has been previously demonstrated in
the context of GSM networks targeting the uplink RACH
[20].
The first message exchange on this channel allows the
UE to synchronize in the uplink and, after the initial access
procedure, radio resources can be allocated to the UE.
In order to target a specific LTE uplink control chan-
nel, the attacker would need to know the actual PRBs
assigned to it at the PHY layer. This PRB assignment
can be obtained from publicly available documentation.
Nevertheless, as it will be presented in Subsection 4.4, if
the actual location of this signals in the time-frequency
LTE frame was randomized or scrambled, such radio
resource assignment information could still be obtained
from the SIB unprotected messages carried by the PBCH
and PDSCH.
In the context of a sophisticated and highly targeted
attack, one should note that the MCC and MNC of an
eNodeB are also encoded in the SIB-1 message. Eaves-
dropping of this information would allow an attacker, for
example, to selectively target a jamming charge against
base stations from a specific cellular network operator.
Note that uplink smart jamming, while being much
more effective than basic jamming or downlink smart
jamming, is a more complex attack. In order to selectively
jam the PRBs assigned to, for example, the RACH chan-
nel, an attacker should be perfectly synchronized in time
and frequency with the LTE signal. Moreover, the attacker
should be able to capture and decode the MIB and SIB
messages in order to extract the actual RACH PRB alloca-
tion information. Therefore, a skilled attacker and moder-
ate development work on, for example, software-defined
radio would be required.
3.2.1 LTE link budget
To illustrate the gain in transmitted power and, therefore,
range of uplink smart jamming, we compute the link bud-
get for a typical 10 MHz LTE system in both the uplink
and downlink. The main parameters of this LTE configu-
ration are described in Table 1. Such calculations can be
done with multiple open access tools available online such
as [21].
Given an eNodeB transmitting at the standard power
(48 dBm), the received power at a UE located at the edge
of a cell is of −100.80 dBm for the largest possible cell
with radius 0.4 Km (i.e., −100.80 dBm is the receiver sen-
sitivity in the DL). Although the maximum size of the cell
is limited by the UL link, for the sake of comparison, we
compute the received power at the eNodeB from a UE
located at the cell edge, 0.4 km away from the UL receiver.
This link budget results in −132.26 dBm received at the
eNodeB. This difference of 31.46 dB between the received
power in the UL and DL indicates that the power the
eNodeB receives from a UE at the cell edge is 1,000 times
Table 1 LTE link budget parameters from a standard
10MHz deployment
System parameters Values
System BW 10 MHz
Subchannel reuse One-three
Carrier frequency 2.5 GHz
#TX antennas 2
#RX antennas 2
Path loss model Cost 231
BS antenna height 30 m
UE antenna height 1.5 m
MCS QPSK 1/2
SNRmin for MCS 8.5 dB [22]
Thermal noise density -174 dBm/Hz
Log-normal fading margin 6 dB
Downlink
eNodeB max power 43 dBm
Multi-antenna gain 3 dB
TX antenna gain 17 dBi
Noise figure 4 dB
Uplink
UE max power 23 dBm
Multi-antenna gain 0 dBm
TX antenna gain -1 dBm
Noise figure 9 dB
lower than the power that the same UE at the cell edge
receives from the eNodeB in the dowlink. This gives a
clear indication on the much lower jamming signal power
requirements for an UL smart jamming strategy.
3.2.2 Attack complexity
Based on the characteristics of UL smart jamming, the
attacker would require full synchronization in time and
frequency with the LTE signal to be able to, for exam-
ple, selectively jam the RACH. This raises the complexity
of the attack as compared to DL smart jamming. Never-
theless, there are numerous of-the-shelf and open access
tools that could be leveraged in this context.
The USRP is commonly used for GSM-related projects,
but there are certain ongoing open source projects that
could be used to write software radio applications that
synchronize with an LTE signal. One example is the
openLTE project [23]. Leveraging these tools, a skilled
attacker could potentially implement an advanced jammer
at a very low cost. Moreover, there are other off-the-shelf
applications and tools that allow a user to synchronize
with an LTE signal such as specialized LTE sniffing hard-
ware and commercial software-based LTE base stations.
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3.3 Rogue base station attacks
Rogue base station attacks have been proposed in the lit-
erature as a means to, for example, steal credentials or
invade the privacy of mobile users [9,24]. These attacks
are based on the deployment of a GSM rogue base station
combined with jamming the UMTS and/or LTE network
in order to force as many UEs as possible to camp on
the fake GSM cell. Many security features of GSM have
been defeated over the last few years [25]. Given that the
authentication algorithm is not symmetric, the network
is not required to authenticate, so the UE believes it is
connected to a real base station.
An efficient technique to maximize the potential num-
ber of devices camping on the fake cell is by advertising the
id of the rogue base station based on the list of neighbor-
ing cells broadcasted by legitimate base stations. Note that
such information can be extracted from the unprotected
downlink broadcast MIB and SIBmessages. From the data
sniffed from such broadcast messages, one can efficiently
tune the transmitted power of the rogue cell as well such
that the UEs will handoff to the rogue base station.
Note that both techniques leveraged to optimize a rogue
base station attack (jamming of the LTE network and
obtaining information from the unencrypted MIB and
SIB messages) leverage the vulnerabilities introduced in
Section 2.
4 LTE security solutions against jamming attacks
One of the goals of this proof of concept paper is to pro-
pose research directions to enhance the resilience of LTE
against smart jamming threats.We introduce a set of secu-
rity research directions at the PHY layer of LTE networks,
aiming to enhance the resiliency of data communications
against jamming. The envisioned security system would
protect communication systems by mitigating the radio
jamming attacks discussed in Section 3. These solutions
would also minimize the system configuration informa-
tion that an attacker can easily eavesdrop in order to
leverage a jamming charge or the deployment of a rogue
base station.
The proposed theoretical security system is based on an
enhancement of the resiliency against radio jamming of
the PBCH by means of a spread spectrum transmission.
This can be combined with scrambling of the PRB alloca-
tion of UL control channels and a distributed encryption
scheme for downlink control broadcast messages. On one
hand, the system protects its most vulnerable resources,
downlink control channels, which are the target of DoS
attacks [6]. On the other hand, MIB and SIB messages are
protected so an attacker cannot learn any information on
the PRB allocation for the other control channels, which
are now randomly allocated in time and frequency. Only
with the information encoded and encrypted in the MIB
and SIB messages an attacker would be able to aim to the
UL control channels with a jamming charge. Full applica-
tion of such security solutions render a jamming attack to
be only as effective as basic barrage jamming. Note that in
jamming mitigation studies, the goal is precisely to force
any sophisticated jamming attack to be just as efficient as
standard jamming [17].
Note that the full implementation of the proposed
techniques would not be trivial, as it will be discussed
throughout this section. For example, the scrambling of
the PRB allocation of UL control channels will challenge
the SC-FDMA scheduling in the uplink because it could
potentially break up the continuity of user allocations.
The successful implementation of some of these solutions
would be very challenging in commercial networks. Nev-
ertheless, such modifications at the PHY layer could be
aimed for the development on the Nationwide Interoper-
able Public Safety Broadband Network, with a PHY layer
based on LTE [2,3]. Such next-generation communication
systems for emergency response present strict security
requirements and should be protected against potential
jamming attacks.
4.1 Spread-spectrum jamming resiliency
By means of jamming the central 1.08 MHz of any LTE
signal, an attacker would deny the service to all UEs in
its vicinity. Therefore, it is important to enhance the pro-
tection of the main broadcast channels at the PHY layer.
The goal is to counteract the advantage in bandwidth
and transmitted power the jammer has due to this LTE
vulnerability [6].
Newly deployed LTE networks implement a completely
redesigned modulation scheme that substantially maxi-
mizes the performance of the wireless channel in terms of
bits per second per Hertz (bps/Hz). However, the imple-
mentation of an OFDMA-based PHY layer lacks of the
inherent interference resilience features of code division
multiple access (CDMA)-based networks.While OFDMA
is often the choice because of its robust performance in
challenging multipath environments, it is not optimal for
scenarios where adversarial entities intentionally attempt
to jam communications, such as in tactical scenarios [17].
The strong interference resiliency of CDMA-based net-
works is well known [26,27]. The application of a scram-
bling signal with a high chip rate to the transmitted signal
spreads the spectrum to levels that, in some cases, can
be masked by the thermal noise at the receiver. Upon
reception of the signal, application of the same code,
orthogonal with the code used in other base stations or
UEs, allows to recover the original signal. Due to the
nature of the transmitted signal in UMTS, based on W-
CDMA, an interfering signal needs to be transmitted at
a very high power in order to jam the communication.
This is due to the fact that the process of despreading
the signal spectrum at the receiver causes, assuming an
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interfering signal uncorrelated with the scrambling sig-
nal, an inherent reduction of the interference power by
log10(G) decibels (dBs), being G the spreading factor or
processing gain of the W-CDMA signal [26].
Considering the characteristics of broadcast channels,
one could envision an alternative transmission scheme
where the main downlink broadcast channels are pro-
tected by a spread spectrum-based method. Although
downgrading from OFDMA could potentially decrease
the available throughput for broadcast messages, such
control channels are known for having very low overhead
and a low throughput of, in the case of the PBCH, just 350
bps [1].
4.1.1 System description
The proposed security solution applies a spread spectrum-
based modulation to the downlink control channels in
order to extend their spectrum over the available BW. This
could be done by just expanding the BW of the downlink
broadcast signals or by applying an actual CDMA-based
modulation on this portion of the LTE signal.
This solution by itself would prevent a downlink jam-
ming attack to be launched with a simple radio transmitter
or jammer, which substantially increases the attack com-
plexity and cost. To perform such attack, full synchroniza-
tion in time and frequency would be required in order
to apply the same CDMA spreading code to the jamming
signal. In the case that an attacker does incur this cost,
a further enhancement to this solution is described in
Subsection 4.3.
Assuming a scrambling or spreading sequence with a
rate of Rb ·G, with Rb being the rate of the PBCHmessages,
a jammer would theoretically require an extra log10(G)
dBs of transmitted power in order to achieve the same
result. With the transmitted power kept constant, the BW
of the jamming signal would be reduced by a factor of up
to G times. With both power and BW kept constant, the
range of the attack would be reduced.
4.1.2 Limitations and potential implementation
The main limitation of the solution is that the UE requires
a finer synchronization with the DL signal. In addition
to that, the effectiveness of the defense is directly pro-
portional to the spreading factor of the broadcast sig-
nal. Therefore, either extra BW should be allocated for
the PBCH or its PRB allocation should be modified and
spread over the available 1.08 MHz. Nevertheless, with an
effective throughput of just 350 bps, there is potentially
room for improvement.
In order to be implemented in commercial cellular,
this technique would require changes in the LTE stan-
dards. Moreover, it would not be backwards compati-
ble with current LTE terminals unless the PBCH and
broadcasting messages were transmitted both within
the central subcarriers and with the spread spectrum
enhancement. Nevertheless, this solution is feasible and
could be implemented in the context of an anti-jamming
security-enhanced LTE-based military or tactical net-
work, which would use custom wireless devices and
eNodeBs.
4.2 LTE, MIB, and SIB message encryption
As introduced in Subsection 2.2, the MIB and SIB
messages broadcasted by an eNodeB contain essential
network configuration parameters that aid the UE to syn-
chronize and establish a connection with the network.
Nevertheless, all these messages are transmitted in the
clear with obvious security implications.
Assuming a hypothetical scenario with control broad-
cast messages encrypted but no specific protection for the
PSS and SSS, an attacker could not obtain any configura-
tion information by means of a commercial traffic sniffer.
A skilled attacker could still synchronize with the net-
work by means of a SDR platform. Extraction of network
configuration information, though, would be impossible,
assuming a strong encryption scheme. Therefore, the only
way an attacker could obtain the network configuration
details would be by using a legitimate wireless device and
hijacking it to extract data from the baseband chip, which
is unreachable from the user space.
4.2.1 Initial limitations
A simple encryption scheme cannot be applied to the
system information messages. If the information in the
PBCH was encrypted with a secret key, the mobile termi-
nal must know that key a priori. Assuming the case of a
mobile terminal being turned on or roaming to a new net-
work, the device must still be able to decode the PBCH
to establish a connection. In parallel, key exchange algo-
rithms cannot be executed with the network at this stage
because the device is not connected and authenticated yet.
Therefore, the key that encodes the MIB and SIBs must be
hard-coded in the UE.
Relying on one common key for all users and cells is not
possible either. If this key was compromised by anymeans,
the whole system would be useless. Therefore, the system
must be able to operate with a large number of different
keys or able to generate a large number of keys.
4.2.2 Assumptions
The main assumption for this security architecture is a
global collaboration of all mobile operators. Subscriber
identity module (SIM)-based authentication schemes
allow to provide cellular services to a mobile terminal
independently of the network being roamed (assuming, of
course, that the user has roaming activated and the phone
and network are compatible). Encryption of the MIB and
SIBmessages would require a similar collaboration among
carriers.
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It is important to note that, in the case of such encryp-
tion scheme being applied exclusively to a national LTE-
based emergency response broadband network, such as
the Nationwide Interoperable Public Safety Broadband
Network, this limitation does not apply.
The proposed solution assumes that the UE is equipped
with a trusted hardware (HW) platform which is secure
and able to both securely store data and perform cryp-
tographic operations. Note that all UEs are already pro-
visioned with such element, the SIM card. Basing the
encryption scheme on the SIM, though, could poten-
tially allow an attacker to capture LTE wireless traffic and
decode it afterwards with a legitimate SIM on a standard
card reader connected to a personal computer. There-
fore, such encryption scheme would only be effective if it
was implemented on a protected trusted platform mod-
ule (TPM) that can be only operated by, for example, the
baseband of a cell phone. Note that there are initial plans
in the industry to equip UEs with a TPM [28]. In the con-
text of a national emergency response network, equipping
mobile devices with a secure TPM is feasible. Finally, a
strong private key encryption scheme is assumed.
4.2.3 System description
The proposed solution is depicted in Figure 5. On the net-
work side, either each base station or a node in the EPC
stores a set of N secret keys in a secure location. In the
case of storing the keys in a centralized way, this secure
storage could be the home subscriber server (HSS) or any
other newly implemented network node. On the other
hand, the TPM (or SIM card) in each mobile phone stores
securely the same set of N keys. The value of N can be
arbitrarily large.
Note that, in practice, only one secret key K would be
required. Based on this initial secret key, each sub-key Kj
j = 1, ...,N would be generated as Kj = H(K |j), being
H a hash function and ‘|’ the concatenation operation.
Assuming a robust hash function, eventual leakage of a
sub-key Kj would not provide an attacker any information
on the actual secret key K. However, leakage of the main
secret key K would relent this method useless.
The operation of the system is described as follows.
The eNodeB selects a key Kj with id j. The broadcast
MIB and SIB messages are encrypted with the key Kj and
transmitted over the air. Along with the encryption of the
broadcast message, for example encKj(MIB), the system
transmits the id j in plain text. This way, any UE knows
what key to use to decrypt the messages. Note that an
attacker would learn the id j but would not be able to know
the key Kj that is being used to encrypt the broadcast
messages.
If at any point a key was compromised, the network
would be able to switch to a different key Ki and continue
operating normally. A broadcast message would be sent
to the mobile devices to alert them of this change. Incom-
ing connections, either via handovers from other cells
or new devices being turned on, would just receive the
updated broadcast messages [ i|encKi(MIB)] and continue
operating normally.
Note that the network could choose to use a different
key at each cell/sector. This way, if an attacker managed
to compromise a key, a potential attack during the time it
would take the network to change to a new key would be
localized and only impact one cell or sector.
In this section, the MIB message is used as example, but
the same scheme could be applied to SIB messages as well.
4.2.4 Limitations and potential implementation
Themain limitations for this security enhancement of LTE
networks is the requirement for a global partnership of
both cellular operators, device manufacturers (in the case
of the deployment of a TPM), and SIM card providers.
Moreover, a substantial editing of the standards would
be necessary. Therefore, such a security solution, when
Figure 5 LTE MIB message encryption.
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framed in the context of commercial wireless networks,
would be more appropriate for the upcoming fifth gener-
ation of mobile networks, the standards of which are just
being started.
In the context of high security demanding LTE-based
communications, such as military networks or first
responders, the encryption of broadcast messages is more
feasible. Based on custom hardware equipped with state-
of-the-art TPM and encryption schemes, such a system
could be deployed.
It is important to note that, by itself, the encryption of
the broadcast messages would not prevent an attack from
jamming the LTE central subcarriers (downlink smart
jamming) and block users from detecting and decoding
the PSS and SSS and, therefore, connect to the cell.
4.3 Spread-spectrum and encryption combination
As introduced in Subsection 4.1, if an attacker obtained
the sequence used to protect the central subcarriers of
the LTE signal, the spread spectrum anti-jamming solu-
tion would be useless against a skilled attacker using a
fully synchronized jamming device. In this section, we
introduce an enhancement of the spread spectrum pro-
tection based on the encryption scheme described in
Subsection 4.2.
4.3.1 Assumptions
In order to prevent an attacker from encoding the jam-
ming signal with the right sequence and, therefore, bypass
the protection, this spreading sequence must be only
known by the UEs and the eNodeB. In parallel, the entire
system cannot depend on a single spreading sequence
because, if it was compromised, the protection would be
bypassed. Therefore, the spreading sequence selection can
be implemented as follows.
4.3.2 System description
The proposed enhanced security architecture is depicted
on Figure 6. On the network side, either each eNodeB or
the HSS stores a set ofM secret spreading sequences. The
value of M can be arbitrarily large. The eNodeB selects a
sequence Si with id i and scrambles the PBCH signal with
it prior to broadcasting it. Along with the scrambled signal
PBCH(t) · Si(t), the eNodeB broadcasts the id i, either on
the same channel or on a separate resource. This allows
the UE to despread the PBCH with the right sequence. An
attacker would just learn the id i but would not be able to
extract the sequence Ci used to protect the DL signal.
Note that, when enhancing the resiliency against jam-
ming of the MIB messages following this scheme, the
sequence Si(t) used to scramble the signal can be seen as
the equivalent of the key ki used to encrypt the MIB.
4.3.3 Limitations and potential implementation
With the combination of the MIB and SIB message
encryption and the spread spectrum protection against
jamming, an attacker cannot leverage the knowledge of
the id i, broadcasted in the clear, to optimize the attack.
However, if the attacker was able to jam the actual broad-
cast transmission of the id i, the wireless system would
be inoperative as no legitimate user would be able to
determine what spreading code is being used in a given
cell.
Figure 6 CDMA-based protection of the PBCH: scrambling (a) and descrambling (b).
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This could be prevented in different ways. In the case
of LTE-based systems with a specific application, such
as military ad-hoc networks or first responder wireless
systems, the id i could be distributed through an out of
band secondary channel or known a priori before deploy-
ing the ad-hoc network. Alternatively, the id i could be
broadcasted in a more complex yet secure manner, such
as the primary scrambling code detection in UMTS net-
works [26]. In this case, a receiver detects which one of
the 512 possible primary scramble codes is being used
within a cell by applying a correlation receiver. The neces-
sary signals for the primary scrambling code detection are
often transmitted in a way that they can be received and
decoded at a low SNR regime. A similar procedure could
be implemented to, for example, broadcast which one of
512 possible sequences Ci with i = {1, 2, ..., 511} is being
used.
Finally, the sequence id could be broadcasted repeat-
edly in a frequency hopping scheme over the entire sys-
tem bandwidth. Although this would require substantial
changes to the LTE standards, it would force an attacker to
jam the entire band to jam the id broadcasting operation.
Therefore, the goal of counteracting the advantage a jam-
mer has in LTE networks would be achieved as the only
feasible option would be barrage jamming.
4.4 LTE UL control channel PRB scrambling
The PRB allocation of the Physical Uplink Control Chan-
nel (PUCCH) is known a priori as defined by the
standards. The UL control signaling on this channel is
transmitted in a frequency region on the edges of the sys-
tem BW. In parallel, the PRB allocation of other essential
UL control channels, such as the RACH, can be extracted
from the SIB messages.
4.4.1 System description
The proposed security architecture scrambles the PRB
allocation of UL control channels so they cannot be the
target of an uplink smart jamming attack. Based on the
encryption scheme described in Section 4.2, a legitimate
UE would be able to decode the system configuration and
normally operate on the UL control channels. An attacker,
though, would not be able to locate any UL control chan-
nel and its best UL jamming strategy would be equivalent
to a basic barrage jamming.
4.4.2 Limitations and potential implementation
Periodically modifying the PRB allocation of certain UL
control channels, such as the RACH, would not be chal-
lenging given the multiple possible configurations of the
RACH in current LTE networks. However, the alloca-
tion of the PUCCH away from the edges of the spectrum
would generate new limitations. The frequency diver-
sity achieved through frequency hoping would not be
maximized anymore. In parallel, the maximum achiev-
able PUSCH data rate would decrease due to the fact
that uplink allocations must be contiguous in frequency
to maintain the single-carrier nature of the uplink LTE
signal [1]. Random allocation of the UL control channels
could potentially pose a challenge to SC-FDMA schedul-
ing because it could break up the continuity of user
allocations.
In this case, the implementation of this security solution
would require changes in the LTE standards. However,
a potential application for security-demanding military
and first responder LTE-based networks could be imple-
mented using nonstandard hardware on both transmitting
and receiving sides.
4.5 Selective uplink smart jamming interference
cancelation
In order to enhance their coverage range and apply diver-
sity techniques, cell towers are equipped with multiple
antennas. The number of antennas at the cell tower is
commonly three but some network operators are pushing
this number to five in LTE networks to expand further the
system’s capacity [29]. The cell range in the DL is often
bounded by the base station’s transmitted power, which
is significantly higher than that of a UE. Therefore, the
multiple antennas implement spatial diversity in the UL to
extend the cell’s range limited by the UE.
The proposed security architecture includes a further
application that exploits the availability of multiple anten-
nas to suppress the interfering signal of the smart UL
jammer, defined in Subsection 3.2. Similar methods have
been proposed in the literature aiming to mitigate the
effects of a jamming signal in a wireless system by means
of jointly mechanically adjusting an array with two anten-
nas and applying an interference cancelation algorithm
[30].
4.5.1 System description
The proposed security scheme implements beam-forming
techniques at the eNodeB that leverage the availability
of up to five antennas in reception. By means of a con-
figurable signal feed, with variable delays and gains, the
radiation pattern of an antenna array can be molded to
achieve either enhanced directivity or strongly attenuate
the signal coming from a specific direction [31]. Assum-
ing the location of the jammer was known, a null in the
antenna radiation pattern of the eNodeB could be gener-
ated to selectively block the interference. Figure 7 depicts
an example of such application.
The attenuation of the interfering signal will depend on
the null of the radiation pattern. In order to locate the
source of the interference, a narrow directive radiation
pattern can be shifted while monitoring SNR and traffic
congestion metrics on the UL control channels, scanning
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Figure 7 Beam-forming scheme for selective cancelation of UL smart jamming.
this way the entire cell or sector. This would allow to
determine the angle of arrival of an incoming UL jamming
signal.
4.5.2 Limitations and potential implementation
Note that the proposed architecture requires the multiple
antennas of the eNodeB to perform both spatial diversity
and beam-forming. The spatial separation between anten-
nas required to optimize the diversity receiver substan-
tially increase the phase or delay between each antenna
element. In terms of the beam-forming, this could result
in a suboptimal radiation pattern with considerable side
lobes and a wider null in the radiation pattern. A trade-
off should be found between the performance of the array
in terms of diversity/MIMO and the ability to generate a
narrow beam.
In parallel, all the UEs located in line with and in
the close vicinity of the jammer would not be able to
access the networks. Nevertheless, the range of the jam-
mer would be significantly reduced, efficiently mitigating
any uplink smart jamming attack.
It is important to note that this particular secu-
rity enhancement is completely independent and both
the hardware (multiple antennas at each eNodeB) and
the technology (beamforming) already exist. A potential
implementation could be framed within the concept of
self-organizing networks (SON), as a an automatic smart
jamming attack detection plus self-healing security func-
tion. Upon detection of an anomaly in a given eNodeB,
in the shape of a strong decrease in the load or anoma-
lous decrease in the SNR, the cell would go into detection
mode. A narrow reception beam would scan the cell or
sector. In the case of an ongoing uplink smart jamming
attack, the cell would then go into a defense state, creating
a null in reception and blocking the malicious interfering
signal.
5 Related work
Jamming attacks are the main basic type of threat that
wireless communication networks face given the fact that
the threat vector exploited is inherent to the actual tech-
nology. There is no way to prevent an attacker from
broadcasting high-power signals on the frequency band
allocated to a commercial mobility network. The goal of
this attack is often to prevent users to access communi-
cation networks, which catalogues this threat as a DoS
attack. Several attacks proposed in the literature use radio
jamming as a first step in order to force UEs to an insecure
access network [24].
Jamming attacks have been in the scope of network and
security research for several years already [16]. As new
network standards arise, jamming attacks spread their
threat over new technologies such as wireless sensor net-
works (WSNs) [15] and WLANs [4]. Mobility networks,
the main commercial wireless networks, have also been
considered in radio jamming studies [14].
In parallel, the potential of this kind of attack has lead to
improvements and refinements, resulting in more sophis-
ticated jamming techniques. Over the years, authors have
proposed ways to launch DoS attacks against mobility net-
works by overloading the system at the paging channel
[32] or with a spike in core network signaling messages
[33]. Some other sophisticated jamming techniques have
been proposed for UMTS networks [34].
The author of [20] was the first to implement an actual
smart jamming attack against an UL control channel in
a GSM network, opening a new simple but very effective
attack vector to be leveraged in a radio jamming attack.
The same idea has recently been proposed as a potential
way to jam LTE networks [6].
Despite the prevalence and effectiveness of jamming in
the context of wireless networks, there is a clear lack of
security strategies to mitigate the impact of such attacks,
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specially in current mobility networks and upcoming
LTE-based emergency response broadband systems. Cur-
rent standardization bodies do not consider any jamming
resiliency requirements for the next planned release of
the LTE advanced standard. Nevertheless, some work has
been done in addressing jamming attacks in WLANs [35]
and WSNs [15].
6 Conclusions
Jamming attacks are one of the main types of security
attack that mobility networks face. This threat is inher-
ent to the actual wireless technology employed in this type
of network, and in its most basic implementation (bar-
rage jamming), there is no means to prevent an attacker
from broadcasting a high power interfering signal on a
commercial frequency band.
Despite that jamming attacks are well known and have
been widely studied in the literature, no actual security
and mitigation strategies have been proposed to enhance
the resiliency against jamming attacks in mobility net-
works. This has resulted on a constantly growing list of
new proposals for sophisticated DoS attacks against cel-
lular networks based on jamming principles. However,
standardization bodies do not include any anti-jamming
guidelines or requirements for the upcoming new releases
of LTE advanced. Nevertheless, the forecasted application
of LTE-based technologies to implement national emer-
gency response networks make the reliability and security
requirements of LTE of paramount importance.
In this proof of concept paper, we overview a series of
simple but effective jamming attacks that extend the range
of basic jamming while requiring less power. Based on
these new threats, classified as smart jamming, we pro-
pose a series of potential security research directions that
could protect LTE cellular networks, forcing a potential
attacker to rely on just basic jamming to attempt a DoS
charge. The goal is to raise awareness on this tradition-
ally overlooked threat and spark security research work
in this area. We are, in parallel, implementing smart jam-
ming in the lab as well as some of the proposed security
solutions.
A potential enhancement of the anti-jamming proper-
ties of the main DL broadcast channels, importing con-
cepts from spread spectrum modulations, protects the
wireless interface from a smart jamming attack aimed
to such control channels. In parallel, a randomization of
the PRB allocation of UL control channels plus a sophis-
ticated encryption method for DL system configuration
messages, backed up by the deployment of a TPM in
the UE, prevent an attacker from launching a smart jam-
ming attack against these essential UL channels. Finally, a
method that leverages the current availability of antennas
at the eNodeB is proposed to filter out an UL smart jam-
ming signal in order to block an UL smart jamming attack.
The limitations for all these solutions have been discussed
as well.
Such enhancements, or similar proposals, should be
considered in the scope and requirements of the upcom-
ing releases for wireless cellular networks, specially for the
Nationwide Interoperable Public Safety Broadband Net-
work. Mobility networks, providing mobility services to
billions of customers over the world, were never designed
with a security perspective. The evolution from GSM
to UMTS and finally LTE has addressed encryption and
authentication issues, aiming to enhance the overall sys-
tem security. The same kind of proactive approach should
be taken in order to mitigate potential DoS jamming
attacks against mobility networks.
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